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Abstract 
Much has been written about corruption and bribery involving major corporations in the United States 
such as Lockheed. However, most of this lite rature ignores the link between Watergate and the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act. The role of accounting and accountants in disguising the use of corporate funds 
for illicit purposes has als o not been addressed even though many of the enquiries into Watergate and 
related activities exp ressed concern that none of the cases of financial misstatement had been 
discovered or, at l east reported, by auditors. In other words, the accountability system envisaged in the 
financial re porting and audit requirements of the Securities Exchange Act and professional pronouncem 
ents had failed. Nonetheless, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has done little to ad dress the accounting 
and audit failures that gave rise to its enactment. The paper uses post-Watergate investigations and 
hearings leading to the enactment of the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977 to 
demonstrate the power of interested parties to influence for their own benefit, the outcome of legislation 
and other forms of regulation. In general, the findings support the observation expressed in the Letter of 
Transmittal of the Final Report of the Se nate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 
(1974a, p.1227) that while "ran k has its privileges because rank has its responsibilities", privilege is often 
used "as a do dge of responsibility". The paper draws largely on historical documents, in particular, rep 
orts of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, transcripts of he aring of 
various House of Representatives and Senate Committees and Sub-Committees dealing wi th issues 
arising from Watergate and Watergate-related activities. 
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Politicians as the guardians of the status quo: A demonstration of rank and 
privilege without responsibility  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this paper is the contribution of politicians and government policy to the flawed 
structure, content and enforcement of legislation and other regulations governing corporate 
activities and management.  Specifically, politicians and the governments they represent are 
responsible for the framework within which regulators attempt to oversee and enforce 
disclosure and the prudent and transparent operation of corporations. From this perspective, 
politicians, as lawmakers who are also responsible for providing adequate funding for 
efficient and effective enforcement of laws, are th gatekeepers protecting the public from the 
abuse of the corporate form. Unfortunately, the gatekeeper role is subject to “perverse 
incentives” of politicians (Zingales, 2011). Similarly, Moe (2003) argues the reform process 
is designed in such a way as to make politicians gatekeepers of the status quo even if this is 
not in the best interests of the public at large: 
American government is built around checks and balances that make new legislation 
difficult to pass and blocking it relatively easy. To be adopted, a reform must make it 
past subcommittees, full committees, and floor votes in two houses (not to mention 
filibusters, holds, and other obstacles), and the executive must sign it. This means 
that reformers must win political victories at each step to achieve their ends, while 
opponents need to succeed at only one step to block. By the design of our political 
system, then, the advantage always goes to interest g oups that want to keep things 
the way they are. 
To demonstrate the ability of interest groups to thwart regulatory reform, an analysis will be 
undertaken of the development of the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act from the 
early 1970s through to the passing of the act in 1977. This time frame has been chosen 
because the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was originally conceived as the means of 
strengthening the corporate accounting and reporting provisions of the Securities Exchange 
Acts of 1933, 1934 in the wake of what has commonly been known as the Watergate scandal1 
and revelations of the use of corporate funds for illicit purposes including the payment of 
bribes and commissions to domestic and international governments and their representatives. 
Watergate has been chosen as the starting point of this paper as investigations revealed 
business-government corruption was endemic and occurred contemporaneously between 
domestic and international business and governments. As was noted in Time in 1975 
Watergate investigations revealed ‘an interweaving of Big Government and big business that 
[created] a climate conducive to corruption … at the expense of the public interest’. The 
investigations also revealed the dichotomy between privilege and responsibility as indicated 
in the Letter of Transmittal of the Final Report ofthe Senate Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities (1974a, p.1227) that while “rank has its privileges because 
rank has its responsibilities”, privilege is often used “as a dodge of responsibility”. 
 
                                                 
1 The bungled Republican Party burglary of the Democrati  Party headquarters in the Watergate Building in 
1972 and the subsequent investigation leading to the first ever resignation of an American president, Richard 
Nixon. Hereafter referred to as Watergate. 
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Initially the paper will outline the background to the discovery of the use of corporate funds 
for purposes of bribery and illegal campaign contributions.  Evidence of and responses to the 
use of financial statements and records to disguise such payments will then be presented.  
Subsequent sections will detail attempts to develop one regulatory response, the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, to the findings of Watergate-related investigations.  The overall 
conclusion of the paper, based on an analysis of the events and hearings leading to the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, is the ultimate soluti n does not match the originally intended 
outcome.  In other words, accountability plays a secondary role to rank and privilege. 
 
THE PATH TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
The level of corruption at the highest levels of U.S. politics and the adage, “rank hath its 
privileges”, was clearly demonstrated by the break-in the of Democratic Party headquarters in 
the Watergate building in 1972.  The break-in was prt of the activities of what was known as 
the “dirty tricks department” of President Richard Nixon’s re-election committee2 (see, for 
example, House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, 1974a).  The brief of the 
dirty tricks department was to develop a “political intelligence operation” including 
electronic surveillance of “political enemies” and opponents (House of Representatives, 
Committee on the Judiciary, 1974a, p.7-9). The purpose of the “dirty tricks” was to discredit 
political opponents especially leading candidates thereby weakening their campaigns and 
likelihood of electoral success (see, for example, S nate Select Committee on Presidential 
Campaign Activities3, Book 10, 1973b, p. 3987-3988).  Much of the public debate following 
media reports of the break-in focused on whether or not Richard Nixon had been aware of it 
and if so, when. This lead to moves to impeach the president (House of Representatives, 
Committee on the Judiciary, 1974b, p.1-3).  The threats of impeachment lead to Nixon’s 
resignation from office in 1974.  Following Nixon’s resignation, much of the focus turned to 
means of preventing or at least curtailing the use of corporate funds for illicit purposes.  
 
The Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities and investigations of the 
Watergate Special Prosecution Force exposed numerous and diverse examples of corruption, 
extortion and other wrong doing including financial statement manipulation on the part of 
executives of many large and prestigious corporations. These revelations gave rise to 
numerous congressional hearings and reports. The following sections will outline the findings 
of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign activities as they relate to financial 
statement manipulation and other evidence of white collar crime.  Subsequent findings and 
recommendations of hearings relevant to the development of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act will then be discussed. 
 
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES 
The most extensive post-Watergate enquiry and report was that of the Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (the Ervin Committee) established on 
February 7 1973 to make a  
 
complete investigation and study of the extent ... to which illegal improper or 
unethical activities occurred in the 1972 Presidential campaign and election and to 
determine whether new legislation is needed to safegu rd the electoral process by 
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which the President of the United States is chosen (Final Report of the Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Letter of Transmittal, June 27, 
1974a)4.   
 
Evidence to the Committee revealed the extensive use of corporate funds for illicit purposes 
and the use of accounting processes to conceal it. For example, the Ervin Committee Final 
Report (Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, 
June 27, 1974a, p.447) revealed foreign subsidiaries represented the most common source of 
corporate contributions to political activities. Accounting for corporate funds in the books of 
subsidiaries was accomplished in a variety of ways including charges for services that were 
not performed or that were invoiced at an inflated rate.  In other instances, contributions were 
disguised as loans or bonus payments to corporate offic rs.  The result was that expenses and 
assets were misrepresented in the financial reports.  Another common method of disguising 
the use of corporate funds for illegal political contributions was to record the payments as 
bonuses to corporate executives and employees.  Accounting for the bonus payments was 
achieved via an administration account and carried as an account receivable even though 
payment was never pursued (Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential 
Campaign Activities, 1974a, p.451-459; Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign 
Activities, 1973c, Book 13, p.5404-5439).  Consistent with its brief, the Committee made 
recommendations on electoral matters. Accounting, audit and other regulatory reforms were 
the subject of other Congressional hearings and SEC reports.  
 
THEGENERAL RESPONSE TO SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON 
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES 
As would be expected, the revelations of the Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 
engendered considerable debate on appropriate solutions o activities uncovered in the 
Watergate and related investigations.  Of considerabl  concern was the magnitude of some 
illicit payments and the high profile U.S. corporations involved. For example, in the hearings 
on Senate Resolution 265 - Protecting the ability of the United States to Trade Abroad5 
Senator Church stated 
We are not just talking about a little “baksheesh” to grease the palm of some petty 
clerk in order to speed needed documents on their way through the bureaucratic 
labyrinth (United States Senate, 1975b, October hearing, p.7). 
Senator Church cite further evidence heard by the Subcommittee on Multinational 
Corporations suggesting  
a tale of kickbacks and shakedowns, of bribery and corruption in the very highest 
military and governmental circles abroad, and the condoning of secret slush funds, 
false bookkeeping, Swiss bank accounts and “fake” subsidiaries by the top 
                                                 
4 The Committee’s final report numbered 1250 pages.  The report was drawn from some 25 books comprising 
hearing transcripts and documents presented to the Committee. The deliberations of the Committee were divided 
into phases: Phase I Watergate Investigation (books 1-9); Phase II Campaign Activities (books 10-12; Phase III 
Campaign Financing (book 13); investigations of specified individuals and entities (books 14-24); and 
Supplemental Material on Campaign Practices and Finances (book 25 dealing with the campaigns of political 
candidates other than Nixon). 
5 Senate Resolution 265 directed the President’s Special Representative for Trade Negotiations and others to 
formulate and negotiate the development of a code of conduct to eliminate bribery and other improper payments 
at a global level (United States Senate, 1975b, October hearing). 
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executives of some of America’s leading firms (United States Senate, 1975b, October 
hearing, p.7). 
In one example cited by Senator Church, one U.S. company had paid over $50million in 
contributions to government parties and members over a nine year period in return for 
favourable tax and energy legislation.  Another example was a U.S. aircraft company paying 
in excess of $100million in agents’ fees in order to sell a Middle East country an aircraft that 
had not competitor.  Much of the $100million went to the Swiss bank account of military and 
civilian defence personnel of the purchasing country (United States Senate, 1975b, October 
hearing, p.7). 
 
Furthermore, as noted by Senator Church, many of those admitting to paying bribes and other 
illicit contributions and fees justified it on the basis it was common practice.  However, he 
expressed scepticism this was the case. 
the fact that corporations, by their own admission, go to such lengths to disguise 
these practices, through the use of double bookkeeping, numbered Swiss bank 
accounts, and a system of code names that would do cre it to the CIA, puts the lie to 
the argument that it is accepted practice  (United States Senate, 1975b, October 
hearing, p.8). 
To be fair, bribery and illicit payments were not unique to U.S. corporations. Evidence 
showed bribery and illicit payments to foreign officials and entities were engaged in by 
companies from other countries.  Accordingly, if the United States were to implement and 
enforce legislation outlawing bribes, payoffs, kickbacks and other unethical payments, 
American companies would be at a disadvantage compared to competitors in other countries 
that were not so constrained. Hence an international solution was also required because other 
countries were unlikely to follow the lead of the United States in prohibiting bribery and 
corruption even though such activities represented a threat to the integrity of global trade 
(Opening Statement by Abe Ribicoff, cited in United States Senate, 1975b, October hearing, 
p.2). It was considerations such as these that gaverise to Resolution 265.  The purpose of 
Resolution 265 was the initiation of negotiations leading to a multilateral agreement to 
eliminate bribery and other illicit payments by corp ations around the world to secure 
international trade6.   
  
In addition to the international solution set out in Resolution 265, a series of amendments to 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were also proposed to strengthen accountability 
provisions as well as prohibiting illicit payments. These proposals were the subject of 
hearings before many Senate and House of Representativ s committees. The culmination of 
these deliberations was the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  The focus of the following 
discussion will be those hearings especially the sections dealing with proposed mechanisms 
to prevent manipulation and falsification of accounting records and reports to disguise or 
otherwise conceal the use of corporate funds for illicit purposes.   
 
                                                 
6 Multilateral agreements were already in process. The OECD adopted Declaration and Decisions on 
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises on June 21, 1976.  The Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions adopted by the Negotiating 
Conference on 21 November 1997.  
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVE  
In June, July and September 1975, the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy of the 
Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives held hearings on the 
Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad.  Among the matters considered 
by the Committee was whether or not U.S. laws were effective.  Issues discussed included the 
implied legality of payments to foreign officials given the absence of legislation prohibiting 
such payments. On the other hand, in some instances, corporations making such payments 
had violated foreign laws. Accordingly, the U.S. legal system was working but may needed 
improvement given the negative impact on the country’s foreign policy in light of revelations 
of illicit payments by U.S. corporations to foreign entities and officials in return for 
favourable treatment (United States Senate, 1975a, p.1).  In this regard, two bills, H.R. 7563 
and H.R. 7539 were to be introduced to the House of Representatives to achieve these 
purposes. These bills proposed monitoring of the ovrseas business activities of American 
citizens and corporations in order to detect possible violation of Federal law and the reporting 
of violations to the responsible agency for enforcement (United States Senate, 1975a, p.4).  
 
Written and oral statements from members of the Securities and Exchange Commission and 
surrounding discussions canvassed the possibility of a requirement under legislation such as 
the Securities and Exchange Act impelling corporatins to disclose material information to 
protect not only American interests in foreign trans ctions but also the investment of 
shareholders of public companies (United States Senate, 1975a, p.24).  SEC Commissioner 
Loomis argued for guidelines to be established to inf rm U.S. corporations on the conduct of 
their dealings with foreign entities. Such guidelins would not be mandatory but part of a 
self-regulation process. As Loomis argued “the most immediate and most effective resolution 
of the problem can best come from American companies th mselves” (United States Senate, 
1975a, p.62). In addition, the public accounting profession, in particular, the audit function 
was implicated in the perceived failure of the regulatory system.  The SEC was 
contemplating working with leaders of the profession t  develop guidelines to assist in the 
audit of published financial reports (United States S nate, 1975a, p.62). 
 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ABUSES OF CORPORATE POWER  
In January and March 1976 four days of hearings on c rporate abuse were held by the 
Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee 
of the Congress of the United States7.  The Subcommittee sought a solution to corporate 
abuse in the form of “official corporate crimes and improper behaviour: bribes, kickbacks, 
illegal campaign contributions, and other improper uses of corporate funds” (United States 
Congress, 1976, p.5-6). Subcommittee chair, Senator William Proxmire, clarified the focus of 
the hearings as official corporate crimes rather than petty theft or embezzlement.  Official 
corporate crimes amounted to “white collar crime” involving “the approval and active 
participation of top corporate management” in the wrongful use of corporate funds (United 
States Congress, 1976, p.5-6). This wrongful use ext nded beyond the payment of illicit 
campaign contributions to domestic politicians to bribery of foreign officials and kickbacks 
paid to domestic and foreign contractors.  Representatives of the SEC, the General 
                                                 
7 Hereafter referred to as the Subcommittee 
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Accounting office (GAO) and the Department of State were questioned by the Subcommittee 
on a number of issues linked to official corporate crime as follows. 
 
The Subcommittee was not solely concerned with white collar crime but also the ability of 
the SEC and General Accounting Office (GAO) to investigate illicit activities and the 
commitment of the Departments of Justice and State to act on the findings of the SEC and the 
GAO to bring criminal charges based on the outcome f those investigations.  A further issue 
addressed by the Subcommittee related to a perceived reluctance on the part of the 
Departments of Justice and State to compel disclosure of information regarding illicit 
payments and the extent to which US government officials were directly or indirectly 
complicit in corporate bribery of foreign entities.  These issues were addressed throughout the 
four hearing days.  The following highlights from the hearings focus on the appearances of 
representatives of the SEC, the GAO and the Department of State.   
 
EVIDENCE FROM SEC REPRESENTATIVES 
The then Chairman of the SEC acknowledged that many companies had engaged in illegal 
practices including the maintenance of secret funds with the involvement and participation of 
senior management.  Accounts were created and maintained “outside the normal financial 
accountability system” to conceal illicit domestic and foreign political contributions often in 
return for favourable treatment.  In some instances, the SEC had not been able to determine 
the destination of funds (United States Congress, 1976, p.6-7).  Companies admitting to 
making and concealing illicit payments included construction, manufacturing and oil 
companies as well as defence contractors.  In all cases, concealment of the use of funds was 
achieved by the falsification or inadequate maintenance of accounting records and books 
(United States Congress, 1976, p.8). Not one instance of falsification or inadequate 
maintenance of accounting records and books was reported by external auditors.  
 
These last points lead to the conclusion on the part of the Subcommittee chair that the 
corporate disclosure system designed to protect shareholders and administered by the SEC 
had not worked (United States Congress, 1976, p.25). In view of this conclusion, the SEC 
representatives were asked to provide the Subcommittee with their views on the adequacy 
and effectiveness of existing laws and regulations a d recommend ways to improve them 
(United States Congress, 1976, p.25). These views were subsequently provided in a detailed 
report dated May 19, 1976 (Special Supplement. Report of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices8). 
 
The SEC Report confirmed concealment of the use of corporate funds to pay bribes, 
kickbacks and illegal campaign contributions.  Concealment had been achieved through the 
use of non-functional subsidiaries, secret bank accounts and various tactics to disguise the 
source of funds or the creation of slush funds including laundering (1976a, p.7; Exhibit A, 
p.16-35).  Details of methods used by a selection of specified companies were included in an 
appendix to the report (1976a, Exhibit B, p.36-45). The SEC found it “particularly disturbing” 
that corporate management not only had knowledge of questionable or illegal activities but 
participated in them (1976a, p.10). In some cases, members of the board of directors were 
also complicit in these activities (1976a, p.11).    
 
Informal views of SEC staff were that  
                                                 
8 Hereafter referred to as the SEC Report 
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virtually all questionable payment matters have involved the deliberate falsification 
of corporate books or records, or the maintenance of inaccurate or inadequate books 
and records which, among other things, prevented thse practices from coming to the 
attention of the company’s auditors, outside directors and shareholders (1976a, p.5). 
 
 Surprisingly, following the instigation of the SEC’s voluntary disclosure program, the same 
auditors and directors were often appointed by the board of directors to special committees to 
uncover the extent of illicit payments and the means by which they were concealed. The 
irony of this was not lost on members of the Subcommittee.  Senator Proxmire asked whether 
it was realistic to expect corporations to effectively police themselves especially when 
directors and officers are usually friends and supporters of each other (United States 
Congress, 1976, p.23-24).  Furthermore, Senator Proxmi e questioned whether or not these 
voluntary committees had actually provided the SEC with complete reports (United States 
Congress, 1976, p.24). 
 
EVIDENCE OF THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE  
Questions about the audit of the financial records of government contractors were raised on 
the second day of hearings when representatives of the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
appeared before the Subcommittee. The GAO had conduted investigations of questionable 
procurement practices on the part of primary governm t contractors and subcontractors. The 
questionable practices included subcontractors providing kickbacks (United States Congress, 
1976, p.46), gratuities, gifts and entertainment (United States Congress,, 1976, p.47) to 
employees of the prime contractors who could influence purchasing and contract decisions. 
Conflicts of interest in procurement decisions were also identified (United States Congress, 
1976, p.47).    
 
In many cases, the cost of kickbacks and other rewards were included in the price paid by the 
prime contractor for the services or goods provided by the subcontractor.  Ultimately, these 
expenditures were borne by the tax payer (United States Congress, 1976, p.50-51).  One 
particular transaction discussed by the Subcommittee nvolved the sale of a part for $1900.  
Two employees of the selling company received more than $6000 each for facilitating the 
sale. On further investigation, the actual cost of he item to the selling company had been 
$190,000. Accounting for the loss on the sale could not be determined but the Subcommittee 
and GAO representatives concluded it had also been passed on to the tax payer (United States 
Congress, 1976, p.54). 
 
As with the manipulation of financial reports uncovered by Watergate and SEC enquiries and 
investigations, it was determined that these were not isolated events.  Rather, even though in 
many cases the amounts involved were relatively small, the practices identified were 
considered to be widespread.  Furthermore, these activities were not uncovered during GAO 
audits (United States Congress, 1976, p.55).  A particular focus of the Subcommittee’s 
questions of the representatives of the GAO focused on revelations of the payment of bribes 
to foreign government officials by Lockheed (United States Congress, 1976, p.60). 
 
Lockheed was the subject of questions by the Ervin Committee.  Campaign contributions 
from Lockheed were not sourced from corporate funds but from employees (Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, 1974b).  However, subsequent 
investigations revealed that Lockheed had paid kickba s to secure favourable outcomes in 
negotiations in a number of countries including Japan, Italy and the Netherlands.  In securing 
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these contracts Lockheed was largely competing withother American companies rather than 
foreign companies.  As argued by Senator Proxmire, the actions of Lockheed put “pressure 
on other American companies to become equally corrupt” (Proxmire, 1976, p.2).  He further 
on pointed out that (Proxmire 1976, p.2), Lockheed’s sales, more than half of which were to 
foreign governments, were “coordinated by the Pentagon”. In addition, the Pentagon put 
pressure not only on Lockheed but other arms manufacturers to increase sale to foreign 
governments.    
 
Lockheed was not a government entity but was the sole recipient of a government loan under 
the Loan Guarantee Act in the early 1970s. The GAO was required by the Loan Guarantee 
Act, “to audit the books, records and transactions f borrowers under the act” (United States 
Congress, 1976, p.60).  In response to questions by the Subcommittee, GAO representatives 
responded that a detailed audit was not required by the Loan Guarantee Act.  Subcommittee 
chairman, Senator Proxmire (United States Congress, 1976, p.60), however, rejected this 
claim citing the relevant provision of the act:  
The General Accounting Office shall make a detailed au it of all accounts, books, 
records and transactions of any borrower with respect to which an application for a 
loan guarantee is made under this act. The General Accounting Office shall report the 
results of such audit to the Board and to the Congress. 
Consistent with the arguments of SEC Commissioner Loomis before the Subcommittee on 
International Economic Policy of the Committee on International Relations (1975, p.62), the 
GAO representatives, maintained “normal audit techniques” would not uncover evidence of 
bribes, kickbacks or money laundering.  Uncovering such evidence would require a detailed 
audit, being “examining every document and tracing ori inal documentation, checks that are 
written, invoices that are at issue” and the GAO could not undertake such a process in the 
space of one year.  Furthermore, the GAO had never carried out the “investigative techniques” 
required to undertake a comprehensive audit.  The GAO had neither the familiarity with such 
techniques nor the authority to implement them.  Criminal or civil fraud was a matter for the 
Department of Justice (United States Congress, 1976, p.60). 
 
EVIDENCE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
On the fourth hearing day on March 5 1976, the Subcommittee heard from representatives of 
the Department of State.  The answer the Subcommittee sought from the Department of State 
was whether or not the US government not only knew but actively promoted bribery of 
foreign officials by some of the country’s largest and most prestigious entities in order to win 
contracts (United States Congress, 1976, p.155).  Specifically, Senator Proxmire contended 
some Pentagon officials, while publicly opposing bribe y and payoffs, actively encouraged 
them and “lectured contractors on how to make payoffs” (Subcommittee on Priorities and 
Economy in Government, 1976, p.155).  The Departmen of State denied covertly fostering 
illicit payments to foreign entities by United States organizations stating 
The Department of State has never condoned such payments. They are ethically 
wrong; their disclosure can unfairly tarnish the reputations of responsible American 
businessmen; they make it more difficult for the U.S. Government to assist U.S. 
firms in the lawful pursuit of their legitimate business interests abroad; they 
encumber our relations with friendly foreign governments; they are, in the long run, 
bad business, as firms involved in such practices risk loss of contracts, sales and even 
property; and they contribute to a deterioration of the general investment climate 
(United States Congress,1976, p.156). 
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In general, the questions raised by the Subcommittee and the allegations of complicity in 
illicit payments by U.S. corporations to foreign entities, could not be substantiated. A 
cautious approach was taken by the Department of State to dealing with illicit foreign 
payments to foreign corporations and officials due to the negative impact this might have on 
the competitiveness of US corporations dealing abroad. Accordingly, corporations were not 
compelled to provide information to investigators.   
 
For example, as mentioned previously, Lockheed was investigated as part of the Watergate 
hearings.  Even though campaign contributions to Richard Nixon were determined to have 
come from employees rather than corporate funds, Lockheed was found to have paid 
kickbacks to officials in Japan, Italy and the Netherlands in return for favourable 
consideration in the awarding of contracts.  However, these allegations were difficult to 
substantiate because the SEC was denied access to Lockheed files.  The Department of State 
was concerned those files might contain material having adverse foreign policy implications 
and therefore be detrimental to the national interest (United States Congress, 1976, p.33).   In 
addition, Proxmire suggested disclosure of the names of those involved was not forthcoming 
because Lockheed wished to continue to use the sales ag nts involved in prior instances of 
bribery (Proxmire, 1976, p.2). 
 
Further difficulties were encountered in the Lockheed investigation as well as implied 
involvement of the Pentagon in the company’s illicit activities because the Secretary of the 
Treasury was also the Chairman of the Loan Guarantee Board.  In his capacity as Secretary of 
the Treasury, he denounced Lockheed’s bribery and similar illicit activities.  On the other 
hand, as Chairman of the Loan Guarantee Board, he did not use his power to compel 
Lockheed to provide to the SEC and other authorities nformation concerning the nature and 
purpose of said activities (United States Congress, 1976, p.155). 
 
SUMMARY OF HEARINGS 
The Subcommittee (United States Congress, 1976, p.7) summarised practices used to disguise 
the misuse of corporate funds as follows: 
(1)  Bonuses to selected corporate employees which were rebated for use in making 
illegal domestic political contributions by such corp rations;  
(2)  Use of an offshore corporate subsidiary as "cover" for a revolving cash fund for 
distributing diverted corporate funds for both domestic and foreign political 
activities, all of which were illegal in the place where paid;  
(3) Anonymous foreign bearer stock corporations, used as depositories for secret 
illegal "kickbacks" on purchase `or sales contracts; 
(4) Payments to foreign consultants which were diverted to management and used 
for illegal domestic political contributions and commercial bribery;  
(5) Direct, corporate payments to foreign government officials in return for 
favourable business concessions; and  
(6) Payments, aggregating tens of millions of dollars, to consultants or com- 
mission agents, made with accounting procedures, controls and records which, 
if existent at all, were insufficient to document whether any services were even 
rendered by such consultants or agents, or whether such services were 
commensurate with the amounts paid. 
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It was also noted by the Subcommittee (United States Congress, 1976, p.17), management of 
many corporations had filed reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission from 
which information had been omitted or materially misstated.  Consequently, these reports 
violated the provisions of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act.  An aspect of concern to the 
Subcommittee, was that none of the instances of falsification of records or material 
misstatement of accounts uncovered by the Watergate Sp cial Prosecutor or SEC 
investigations had been reported by the accountants or external auditors of the relevant 
companies (United States Congress, 1976, p.26).  In other words, the reporting systems 
overseen by the SEC were not working (United States Congress, 1976, p.24).  Specifically, 
“accounting procedures have been totally inadequate eith r to determine what has been going 
on or to assure us that they can prevent it in the future” (United States Congress, 1976, p.22). 
 
In contrast to the implication of the Ervin Report that Watergate-related activities were 
“aberrational conduct”, Proxmire argued private enterprise was undermining itself rather than 
monitoring activities.  In particular, “at least animportant part of the private sector is a house 
of marked cards, composed of kings of corruption, jacks of all illicit trades, and aces of 
political influence” (United States Congress, 1976, p.5-6). Proxmire further observed these 
activities had been engaged in by “some of the largest and most prestigious firms in 
America”. 
 
A further concern expressed by Senator Proxmire was the lack of response of the Federal 
Government and its agencies other than the SEC.  In his opening statement on the second day 
of the hearings, Proxmire (United States Congress, 1976, p.39) stated 
The abuse of corporate power is a high priority issue and one that merits extensive 
public debate and discussion. ... Yet the response f the Federal Government has 
been disappointing.  Except for the SEC, most other Government agencies9 eem to 
be sitting on their hands or aiding and abetting the payment of bribes and kickbacks. 
 
The Subcommittee did not express any decisions or make any formal recommendations on 
the basis of the hearings.  However, a solution suggested by Proxmire was new legislation in 
order to deal with corporate abuse.   
 
LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES AND HEARINGS  
From 1976 to 1977, different bills were presented to the Senate and the House of 
Representatives by different Senators, Congressmen and the SEC in relation to questionable 
payments. Ultimately the Senate and the House separately decided on a bill to be passed as 
the FCPA, however,  
 
[t]he House version of the bill did not contain the accounting provisions at all, 
and…were never debated on the House floor or in a House committee. In the Senate, 
the accounting provisions were overshadowed by the looming issue of overseas 
payments (Committee on Corporate Law and Accounting 1978, p.309). 
 
For this reason, the following sections will focus on bills presented to the Senate rather than 
the House of Representatives. 
 
                                                 
9 Those agencies identified by Senator Proxmire were the FBI, Justice Deparment, IRS and the Statement 
Department. 
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Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs: Prohibiting bribes to foreign officials 
In April and May 1976, the United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs conducted three days of hearings dealing with three proposed bills to address bribes to 
foreign officials.  The two bills to be discussed in this section are 
S.3133 sponsored by Senator Proxmire to amend the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934 to require issuers of securities registered pursuant to section 12 of such act to 
maintain accurate records and to furnish reports relating to certain foreign payments, 
and for other purposes; and 
S.3418 sponsored by the Securities and Exchange Commission to amend the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to prohibit certain issuers of securities from 
falsifying their books and records, and for related purposes. 
 
During the course of the hearings, the Committee Chair, Senator Proxmire, referred to 
previous Committee hearings into the payment of bribes by Lockheed plus the voluntary 
program instituted by the SEC leading to disclosure that hundreds of millions of dollars had 
been paid in bribes by U.S. corporations to foreign officials and political parties.  Proxmire 
described these activities as the “disgrace of our free enterprise system” that had “corrupted 
the free market system under which the most efficient producers with the best products are 
supposed to prevail” (United States Senate, 1976a, April hearings, p.1).  It was further noted 
the SEC’s voluntary disclosure program was premised on the view “foreign bribes are 
information material to investors” (United States Senate, 1976a, April hearings, p.3). 
 
As Proxmire noted many high calibre corporate executives and politicians, including then 
President Ford, had denounced bribery and saw it as unnecessary for corporations to compete.  
In spite of such condemnation, Proxmire argued “many companies will continue paying 
bribes if they can get away with it, because the pot ntial rewards are so great and the risks are 
minimal” (United States Senate, 1976a, April hearings, p.1).  The absence of risk was 
exemplified by the failure of the Department of Justice to prosecute “prominent corporate 
criminals” (United States Senate, 1976a, April hearings, p.2).   At worst, there had been some 
bad publicity but no one had gone to jail and only three chief executive officers had lost their 
jobs. The provisions of S.3133 were designed to address these issues.  The general view of 
those appearing before the committee demonstrated resistance to any legislative response 
with potential to impringe on the manner in which management wished to conduct the 
activities of corporations caught by the legislation.  
 
The first to give evidence before the committee was John McCloy. McCloy had been the 
chair of the Special Review Committee of the Gulf Oil Corporation’s Board of Directors 
appointed to investigate the payment of political contributions from shareholders’ funds.  The 
investigation revealed the payment over a period of some twelve years of illegal campaign 
contributions of approximately $5 million from off-the-books accounts. Payments of 
unknown amounts had been made to foreign governments a d officials in exchange for 
favourable treatment. Other payments of unknown amounts made for unidentified reasons 
had also been made. McCloy stated payments in many instances were customary and not 
considered illegal in the countries in which they were paid (United States Senate, 1976a, 
April hearings, p.4). 
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According to McCloy, a constructive and effective lgislative response to political 
contributions and payments was not possible without further study of what was a very 
complex issue. For example, there was no accepted definition of bribery.  Where did you 
draw the line between a tip or a gift and a bribe (United States Senate, 1976a, April hearings, 
p.5-6)?  In other words, should all payments to foreign officials or governments be disclosed 
to investors (United States Senate, 1976a, April hearing, p.10). Legislation prohibiting 
bribery and political payments did not exist in theU.S. or anywhere else in the world.  This 
was not to say nothing should be done but the initial focus should be the United States 
(United States Senate, 1976a, April hearing, p.5-6)   
 
While McCloy supported the view that companies should be required to keep full and 
accurate accounts, he questioned whether new legislation was required (United States Senate, 
1976a, April hearings, p.10).  In response to Proxmire’s concern the furore over disclosure of 
illicit payments would “like so many other things tha  happen in Washington … die down” 
and people would accept it, McCloy urged the Committee o do something but “take time to 
do it” (United States Senate, 1976a, April hearings, p.10).  After all, now the payment of 
bribes and political contributions had been made public and actions had been taken by the 
SEC, “the barn door [was now] well fastened” (United States Senate, 1976a, April hearings,  
p.7).   
 
Consistent with the emerging neoliberal approach, McCloy believed the key was reform by 
industry itself with a focus on the tone at the top (United States Senate, 1976a, April hearings, 
p.14).  Multinational corporations played an important role in the U.S. economy.  Their 
activities were not “synonymous with vicious behaviour”.  Restricting the activities of U.S. 
multinationals with gratuitous regulation would have a serious negative impact on the 
country’s balance of payments (United States Senate, 1976a, April hearings, p.16). 
 
Representatives of the Securities and Exchange Commission appeared before the Committee 
in May 1976.  Proxmire’s preliminary comments included concerns that penalties imposed on 
perpetrators of violent crime, whether premeditated or nor, were often substantial.  On the 
other hand, there was a reluctance to impose penalti s for instances of bribery and other illicit 
behaviour that were not only unethical and damaging to society but were premeditated and 
planned largely by “well educated people from whom we expect the highest kind of ethical 
conduct” (United States Senate, 1976c, May hearings, p.2).  Of concern to the SEC 
representatives, was not the number of corporations involved in illicit payments, as this was 
comparatively small and only a few of those had made substantial payments but the fact some 
large companies had been able to evade the system of corporate accountability enshrined in 
existing regulations meant any company could do so.  H wever, as detailed in the May 1976 
report on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices, the SEC 
representatives supported the philosophy of S.3133, but considered S.3418 was a better 
solution to a “thorny and controversial problem” (1976a, Special Supplement. Report of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and 
Practices, p.13). 
 
Consistent with the views of McCloy, the SEC advocated self-regulation.  The SEC 
acknowledged there had been a breakdown in corporate accountability on the part of a 
minority who “totally ignored the system”(United States, Senate, 1976c, May hearings, p.4).  
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Nonetheless, the SEC representatives believed self-regulation had “the potential significantly 
to enhance the reliability and accuracy of issuer financial reporting” (Securities and Exchange 
Commission 1977a, p.11).  To this end, S.3418 requiments were designed to encourage the 
private sector to correct the problem, with SEC supervision, and without government 
involvement in business practices. In addition, the accounting profession was responding to 
perceived deficiencies in audit processes with proposals to issue a draft standard articulating 
the responsibilities of auditors to identify illegal payments and bring them to the attention of 
management.  With these measures, the problem of illicit payments would be resolved and 
the integrity of the securities system restored (United States Senate, 1976c, May hearings).  
 
S.3418 requirements consisted of corporations establishing and maintaining adequate 
accounting books and records, as well as a system of internal control. The SEC argued these 
requirements would “provide the teeth to assure that problems of this nature…[were] brought 
to appropriate levels of corporate management, and recorded in a manner that…[made] it far 
easier for…[the SEC] to discover them” (United States,  Senate,  1976c, May hearings, p.19).   
There were three principles underlying the SEC’s proposed remedy: 
1. corporate accountability to investors required a prope  accounting of the use of 
corporate funds; 
2. to ensure a proper accounting of the use of corporate funds, legislation should prohibit 
false and misleading statements to external auditors on the part of corporate officials 
or agents; and  
3. without internal controls, there was a lack of reasonable assurance that financial 
statements were based on duly authorised transactions and prepared in accordance 
with generally accepted accounting principles and applicable regulations (1976a, 
Special Supplement. Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on 
Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices, p.13). 
In Proxmire’s view, S.3418 merely codified the implied requirement corporations keep 
honest records already incorporated in securities law.  Proxmire reasoned the SEC was 
“…spending a great deal of effort to put a finer point on a requirement that already exist[ed] 
while ignoring the more obvious need for new authori y” (United States Senate, 1976c, May 
hearings, p.19).   Similarly, it was clear from the SEC’s report the concept of internal 
accounting controls added nothing to professional requirements having been enshrined in 
auditing standards issued by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), 
Statement of Auditing Standard (SAS) 1 section 320.28.  In drafting S.3418, the SEC adopted 
the objectives of a system of accounting internals as et out in those standards (1976, Special 
Supplement. Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on Questionable and Illegal 
Corporate Payments and Practices, p.13). It raised concern that the “language that may 
provide guidance to accountants and auditors may not be sufficiently precise to define 
conduct that could result in civil or criminal sanctions” (AICPA cited in Bathen 1978, 
p.1262). On this point it was argued by Dundas and George (1979-1980, p.877) that “[t]he 
language of subsection (B) closely reflects the accounting profession’s own objective”, since 
this standard was “originally developed…to assist independent auditors in evaluating a firm’s 
internal accounting controls to determine whether errors that could materially affect the 
reliability of the firm’s financial statements could be prevented” (Bathen 1978, p.1262).  
  
Given deficiencies in existing law already identified by the SEC itself and outlined in 
previous hearings plus the fact no instances of financial misstatement due to the illicit use of 
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corporate funds had been uncovered by external auditors, Proxmire argued the system had not 
worked  (United States Senate, 1976c, May hearings, p.1). Logically, S.3418 would be no 
more effective than existing legislation and professional standards. The failure of S.3418 to 
add anything to measures that had already failed was compounded by SEC guidelines based 
on the concept of materiality.  The guidelines did not specify what made one bribe material 
and another not.  This lack of specificity meant the guidelines were “very elastic” (United 
States Senate, 1976c, May hearings, p.1). Proxmire fu ther argued the discussion of 
disclosure in SEC Report of May 1976 was very ambiguous containing numerous “hedge 
words” such as “off the book accounts … generally require disclosure” and the use of “may 
be required” as opposed to “is required”.  
 
Hence, Proxmire argued in support of his own S.3133 prohibiting foreign bribery and 
prescribing disclosure of payment of foreign sales commission on the basis the common 
denominator in all proposed legislative remedies to date was disclosure (United States Senate, 
1976c, May hearings, p.2).  In response, the SEC argued it already had sufficient authority 
under existing law to compel disclosure.  After all, the system have had “worked remarkably 
well by any standard. It is the finest enforcement mechanism for business practice” (United 
States, Senate, 1976c, May hearings, p.15).  Proxmie disagreed saying “I would submit that 
your report casts substantial doubt on whether existing law is sufficiently clear on just what 
needs to be disclosed” (United States Senate, 1976c, May hearings, p.2). 
 
In September 1976, another round of hearings commenced on proposals to amend the 
Securities Exchange Act to inter alia prohibit the payment of bribes by corporations, require 
the keeping of accurate records and disclosure of crtain foreign payments.  As with previous 
hearing, introductory statements summarised and conem ed the activities and events leading 
to the proposals.  One issue highlighted at the commencement of these hearings was criticism 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission from some business factions arguing bribery was 
part of the normal course of business.  Furthermore, shareholders had no right to information 
concerning such activities.  As noted by the Committee Chairman, Mr Murphy, the SEC 
persisted in its efforts to effect legislative reform in the belief shareholders were entitled to 
know how a company’s profits were derived.  In turn, this permitted shareholders to assess 
management integrity and performance by being able to determine if profits were based on 
competitive excellence or as a result of financially cquired favourable treatment (United 
States Senate, September hearings, 1976b, p.1). 
 
The argument bribery was a normal part of business activities was refuted by Dr Gordon 
Adams, Director of Military Research, Council on Economic Priorities. Dr Adams the lengths 
some companies had resorted to in order to conceal bribery and similar payments.  Such 
efforts would not have been necessary if companies expected a positive public response to the 
use of corporate funds for purposes of bribery or similar payments (United States Senate, 
September hearings, 1976b, p.34). In addition, Dr Adams rejected notions of self-regulation 
noting one particular company “had an impressive anti-bribery policy in effect while … 
making $100,00 in questionable payments abroad from1971 to 1975”  (United States Senate, 
September hearings,, 1976b, p.33).  For these reasons, Dr Adams saw the proposals 
incorporated in the House of Representative 15481 and its identical Senate counterpart 3664 
and House of Representative 13870 and 13953 as appropriate remedial measures.  
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Once again, the SEC appeared before the Committee.  SEC chairman, Rodrick Hills, 
summarised the findings of investigations of some 200 corporations  
 
… we have found literally hundreds of millions of dollars of corporate funds which 
were placed in hidden accounts and expended entirely at the discretion of corporate 
executives who caused or permitted the payments to be inaccurately recorded on 
corporate books.  … this country’s system of protection for investors, developed over 
the past 40 years, which includes corporate self-regulation through independent 
auditors and outside directors and counsel, and which is ultimately enforced by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, has been seriouly fr strated.  It has … broken 
down (United States Senate, September hearings, 1976b, p.17). 
For these reasons, the SEC supported H.R.15481 (and, thereby, S.3664 as accepted by the 
Senate) to amend the Securities Exchange Act to require corporations under the act to 
maintain accurate records and prohibit bribery.  Specifically, the SEC supported tighter 
internal accounting controls as specified in Section 1 of H.R.15481 and S.3664.  In addition, 
the SEC advocated new accountability measures including independence of the board of 
directors, recognition of the professional responsibilities of outside auditors10 and legal 
counsel and establishment of independent audit committees.  With these new approaches to 
accountability in place, stronger measures were not necessary because “in most cases … the 
failure can be traced to a failure of corporate accountability … to outside auditors, to outside 
directors, to outside counsel and … to outside shareholders” (United States Senate, 
September hearings, 1976b, p.18).  A similar restricted approach was proposed by the AICPA. 
 
The AICPA prepared statement to the Committee expressed concern at requirements for 
companies “to devise and maintain “adequate” system of internal accounting controls 
sufficient to provide reasonable assurances with respect to certain management and 
accounting safeguards” (United States Senate, September hearings, 1976b, p.158). To begin, 
a review of companies known to have engaged in illicit payments demonstrated having a 
system of internal accounting controls was not a panacea.  Most, if not all, of these 
companies had internal controls in place.  The problem was, the controls were circumvented.  
Furthermore, in the absence of a definition, there was no way of determining whether an 
internal accounting control system was “adequate”. AICPA argued that companies seeking 
guidance on the compliance requirements for an “adequat ” internal control system may turn 
to the legal profession for advice and that they might consider a “checklist-type approach” 
( United States Senate, September hearings, 1976b, p.163). In this regards, companies may 
attempt “to attain a system that meets a minimal legal standard rather than to attain the best 
system suitable to the circumstances” ( United States Senate, September hearings, 1976b, 
p.163). The Senate report accompanying S.3664 acknowledged no internal control system 
was perfect and encouraged open discussion between management and auditors to facilitate 
improvement when required.  The SEC endorsed the language as being acceptably clear for 
businesses to follow by arguing that these objects were providing “a reasonable basis for the 
implementation of the required system of controls, and that such objectives are already 
familiar to the business community” (Committee on Corporate Law and Accounting 1978, 
p.337). Ascribing criminality to failure to implement an adequate system of internal 
                                                 
10 including an audit standard being developed by the AICPA dealing with identifying and responding to illegal 
acts by clients. 
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accounting controls would not be conducive to such discussions (United States Senate, 
September hearings, 1976b, p.18-19). 
 
A further concern raised in the AICPA statement wasthe potentially broad scope of provision 
prohibiting any person “from directly or indirectly causing any book, record, or document to 
be falsified  and from making materially false or misleading statements or omitting to state 
material facts necessary to be stated to an accountant in connection with any audit or 
examination”.  In the absence of any qualification such as “deceit” or “intent to deceive”, a 
negligent if honest mistake could result in a criminal conviction (United States Senate, 
September hearings, 1976b, p.159). To address the deficiencies in the proposed 
H.R.15418/S.3664, the AICPA suggested corporate accountability would be best served by 
“requiring the maintenance of accounting records that appropriately reflect transactions and 
dispositions of assets and by prohibiting circumvention of internal accounting, falsification of 
the records, and written representations” (United States Senate, September hearings,1976b, 
p.161). 
 
The Chairman of the Special Committee on Foreign Payments of the Association of the Bar 
of the City of New York, William Kennedy, also appear d before the Committee. Kennedy 
reported the Special Committee acknowledge the needfor reform: “the serious practices … 
exposed over the last several years are clearly contrary to the national interest … there have 
to be measures to prevent a recurrence of these practices” (United States Senate, September 
hearings, 1976b, p.176). However, the Special Committee agreed with the Senate’s rejection 
of previous criminalisation and disclosure proposals.  Those proposals would have created 
two crimes from one act.  The first crime was engaging in bribery or other illicit activities.  
The second was the failure to confess the commission of the first offence. 
 
Kennedy made reference to existing legislation and the “array of sanction” embodied in 
legislation such as securities laws, the Internal Revenue Code and anti-trust laws.  In a 
comment reminiscent of Proxmire’s conclusion the existing accountability system was not 
effective  (United States Senate, 1976c, May hearings, p.6), Kennedy observed “[t]here was 
never a lack of law applicable to the situation. What there was, was a lack of law 
enforcement…This doesn’t mean that you shouldn’t have new laws, but your new law should 
be tailored to the genuine problem and not to the optical one” (United States, Congress, 
Senate, Committee on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs 1976b, p.178).   The preferred 
option of the Special Committee was disclosure (United States Senate, 1976c, May hearings, 
p.181). 
 
COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS. FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES AND DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
DISCLOSURE 
 
Committee deliberations commenced in March 1977 and were, once again,  chaired by 
Senator Proxmire.  The subject of the hearings was S.305 to amend the Securities Exchange 
Act to require maintenance of accurate records and prohibit certain bribes and other purposes 
including making it a criminal offence for an American corporation to pay a bribe to foreign 
officials.  Proxmire observed the SEC had now uncovered 300 U.S. engaged in the bribery of 
foreign officials to an amount in excess of $300 million.  Proxmire argued the findings of the 
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SEC tarnished the reputation of the U.S government.  Furthermore, bribery thwarted fair 
competition because the market was no longer controlled by price and quality. There was no 
disagreement that bribery was wrong.  The question was how to stop it (United States Senate, 
1977, March hearing, p.1). 
 
S.305 had passed through the Senate in 1976 by a unanimous of 86 to zero.  However, 
opposition to the provisions of the bill saw it stalled in the House of Representatives.  Apart 
from addressing the detrimental impact of bribery on the reputation of the United States and 
its corporations, the bill, if passed, would provide leverage to the Administration in effecting 
an international solution (United States Senate, 1977, March hearing, p.2).  Secretary of the 
Treasury, Blumenthal, told the committee the administration fully supported the aims of 
S.305 and, in general, criminalisation of illicit payments.  However, Blumental also urged the 
Committee not to underestimate the difficulties that would be encountered in drafting the bill.  
Specifically, in the absence a multinational treaty nd bilateral agreements, enforcement was 
not likely to be possible.  The administration intend d to pursue international treaties and 
agreements once the provisions of S.305 were enacted. Blumenthal stated the administration 
had no desire to weaken the bill rather enactment of a strong, effective and enforceable bill 
was preferred (United States Senate, 1977, March hearing, p.98). On the other hand, 
Blumenthal stated he found it difficult to comprehend the need for a criminal statute to make 
people behave in their business dealings in the same way they conducted interpersonal 
relationships (United States Senate, 1977, March hearing, p.99). On a more positive note, 
Blumenthal encouraged vigorous pursuit of disclosure requirements and strengthening of 
existing provisions (United States Senate, 1977, March hearing, p.94-95). 
 
SUMMARY OF THE BILLS PRESENTED TO THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES 
  The SEC proposed legislation as part of their report in 1976 was identical to the 
following bills; 
• S.3418, HR.15481, S.3664, S.305 (the Senate version, before it was finalised by the 
House of Representatives).  
 
The accounting section of the bills contained 4 amendments to the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934. The main difference between these bills and the final version of S.305, after it was 
amended by the House of Representatives were as follows: 
• The bills subsection in relation to Integrity of accounting records and reports did not 
include the wording "in reasonable detail". 
• The Systems of accounting controls section of the bills included the wording 
"adequate" which was omitted in the Act.11 
•  The bills third and fourth provisions were taken out f the act as “the SEC had 
already published for comment rules designed to accmplish similar objectives under 
its existing authority”. 
 
 S.3133. that was proposed by Proxmire was only identical to two of the House of 
Representatives bills namely, H.R 13870 and H.R. 13953. The content of the bills were 
mainly similar to the SEC proposal, however, the bills included a section relating to 
                                                 
11 As explained previously 
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public disclosure of details of the amounts, in excess of $1,000, the people or 
organisations to whom the payments were made and the purpose of the payments (House 
of Representatives, 1977a). This section was mainly criticised by the SEC and the bill 
was withdrawn and never debated in the Senate. 
 
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
Accordingly, by December 1977 the FCPA was passed by the Congress “with unusual speed 
and surprising unanimity” (Lacey and George 1997-1998, p.132). The Act was described as 
“in many ways the most important act affecting accounting since the Securities Act of 1933 
and 1934” (Auerbach 1978 cited in Bathen 1978, p.1261). The purpose of the FCPA was to 
protect investors as well as to regulate the accuray of financial information of the companies.  
 
After 1977, the accounting provisions “were never dbated in the House of Representatives. 
In the Senate…very little consideration was given to the accounting standards” (Dundas and 
George 1979-1980, p.870) and as a result the language of the accounting section was 
simplistic and vague (Baker & Bettner 1997). The vagueness of the accounting section was 
questioned since it was introduced as part of the S.3418. Senator Proxmire mentioned that 
“…a vagueness which I would think that the corporati ns wouldn’t like. I think they would 
want the certainty. … to know what they have to repo t and what they don’t have to report” 
(United States, Senate, 1976c, May hearings,  p. 13).  
 
The Act consisted of four sections: Section 101 containing the title of the Act, section 102 
covering accounting standards, and sections 103 and 104 dealing with foreign corrupt 
practices. The accounting provisions were passed as a series of amendments to the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 which increased “the degree of federal involvement in the internal 
management of public corporations” (Lacey and Georg 1997-1998, p.133). These provisions 
of the Act “incorporated only [the first] two of the four rules proposed originally by the SEC” 
(Dundas and George 1979-1980, p.518), as indicated bove, which required registered and 
reporting issuers under the Securities and Exchange Act to: 
• maintain books and records accurately reflecting the transactions and dispositions of 
assets of the issuer; 
• maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls designed to provide 
reasonable assurance that specified objectives are satisfied; 
• prohibit the falsification of an issuer’s accounting records; and, 
• prohibit the officers, directors, or stockholders of an issuer from making false, 
misleading or incomplete statements to an accountant engaged in an examination of 
the issuer (Securities and Exchange Commission 1977a, p.1). 
The SEC subsequently adopted the other two recommendatio s as “SEC rules specifically 
related to the recordkeeping provisions of the FCPA” (Lacey & George 1997-1998, p.135). 
 
The FCPA placed new and significant obligations on issuers to make and keep accurate 
records and to maintain a system of internal accounting controls (Deming 2010), as 
strengthening controls would putatively enhance corporate accountability and ultimately 
public confidence in the corporate sector (cited in Williams 1979). These sections were 
viewed by the Congress “ as a measure to foster managerial accountability and corporate 
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integrity by eliminating the weaknesses in corporate financial control and recordkeeping 
which permitted corrupt payments” (Goelzer 1979, p.4). The details of the section 102 of the 
act are presented below.  
• Maintenance of accurate records: Subsection A of the accounting provision (section 
102) of the FCPA required “Every issuer …shall… make and keep books, records, 
and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the 
transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer” (emphasis added 1977). 
AICPA were concerned about the generality of the provision and the use of 
“accurately and fairly” as it relates to being exact that is not achievable by companies 
and “there is no standard against which achievement of hat precision can be 
measured” (United States House of Representatives 1976, p.7).  
 
• Maintenance of a system of internal accounting controls: Subsection B of the 
accounting standard provision of the Act obliged companies to employ a system of 
internal control by stating that  
Every issuer …shall… devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls 
sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that  
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's general or specific 
authorization;  
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial 
statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other 
criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain accountability for assets;  
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's general or 
specific authorization; and  
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at 
reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences 
(1977). 
This subsection of the accounting provision, represented “the most significant intrusion of 
government into corporate affairs since the original enactment of securities legislation in the 
1930’s” (Siedel 1981, p.444). In corporate history “[i]t was the first time the federal 
government imposed standards of corporate governance upon public companies” (Giudice 
2011, p.351) as there was “a profound and pressing need to seek ways to raise the levels of 
conduct of corporate management” (Roderick Hills cited in Lacey & George 1997-1998, 
p.129). The FCPA gave the SEC the authority to regulate as well as oversee the internal 
management of domestic companies (Bathen 1978; Dundas & George 1979-1980). 
Previously, the SEC “never had the authority to regulate the internal operations of American 
corporations” (Dundas & George 1979-1980, p.880). 
 
CONCLUSION 
The FCPA was prompted by a series of scandals including Watergate involving bribery and 
illicit campaign contributions of domestic and foreign governments, politicians and 
corporations that had shaken public confidence in the integrity of the US business community 
(Gary 1990; Darrough 2010). The Watergate discoveries of patterns of concealed corporate 
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political contributions for the purpose of obtaining foreign government sales and contracts as 
well as influencing the government’s policies (Barovick 1976), demonstrated the 
“tremendous impact on corporations, independent auditors, and the role of the SEC” (Lacey 
& George 1997-1998, p.139). Senator Proxmire ( United States, Senate, 1976c, May hearings, 
p. 3) argued “the fact that so many companies have been able to elude the system of corporate 
accountability strikes us as a matter requiring significant action”. A series of hearings in 
response to these scandals, made it apparent that legislation was required to address corrupt 
activities.  
 
The accounting provisions of the FCPA were arguably “one of the most significant 
expansions of the securities law since the 1933 and 1934 Acts” (Kneedler & Grant 1980, 
p.22). it had the ability to “affect the governance and accountability mechanisms of most 
major corporations, the work of their independent auditors and the role of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission” (Goelzer 1979, p.4). However as argued by Gary (1990, p.12) the 
Act was “the child of political scandal”. The provisions of the act were  self-regulatory 
measures to allow the companies “in conjunction with its outside accountants and counsel” to 
self-discipline their affairs without government involvement as the primary administrator 
(Williams 1979, p.3). Even before the accounting provision was accepted as part of the FCPA, 
there were debates on effectiveness of this act being based on the then existing practices and 
it was argued by one of the senators as follows:  
Mr. President, if this bill were really sufficient to provide a remedy for this immense 
amount of corruption…we could be sure that this place would be buzzing with 
lobbyists. They are not concerned about this bill…that is why these corridors are not 
filled with the lobbyists of any companies coming here to tell us that we must not 
pass this bill (Siedel 1981, p.450). 
Some commentators regarded the Act's accounting provisions, particularly the internal 
control standards, as excessively vague (Securities and Exchange Commission 1981; Siedel 
1981) and lacking in clarity (Roberts 1989). 
 
This brief history of the path to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act provides a clear example of 
the manner in which rank and privilege can be used to maintain the status quo in favour of a 
powerful minority. Many of the hearings heard that the prevailing system of corporate 
accountability had failed. Management had been able to circumvent internal controls and use 
corporate funds for illicit purposes. Internal contr ls were further thwarted by the manner in 
which management was able to record transactions and co ceal improper use of corporate 
funds.  The provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act were progressively eroded to the 
point the act did little more than maintain the status quo.   
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